Brian Brent Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2009
Brian Brent Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. David Eckersley; Prince, Yeats and Geldzahler; Attorney for Appellee.
Gerald H. Kinghorn; Catherine L. Brabson; Parsons Kinghorn Harris, A Professional Corporation;
Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olsen v. Eagle Mountain, No. 20090831.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2986
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIAN BRENT OLSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20090831 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
The Honorable David Mortensen, Dated September 18,2009, 
Denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATS & GELDZAHLER 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Facsimile: (801) 524-1098 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Brian Brent Olsen 
Gerald H. Kinghorn (1825) 
Catherine L. Brabson (6500) 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Professional Corporation 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
City of Eagle Mountain 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 2 6 2010 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIAN BRENT OLSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20090831 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
The Honorable David Mortensen, Dated September 18, 2009, 
Denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATS & GELDZAHLER 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Facsimile: (801) 524-1098 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Brian Brent Olsen 
Gerald H. Kinghorn (1825) 
Catherine L. Brabson (6500) 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Professional Corporation 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4378 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
City of Eagle Mountain 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. OLSEN WAS REQUIRED TO REQUEST A DEFENSE 9 
A. The Plain Language Of The GIAU Specifies That Olsen Request A 
Defense 9 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 Must Be Given Effect 11 
C. The Legislature Purposefully Selected The GIAU Procedures in 
Section 902 Rather Than The Notice of Claim Procedure 14 
D. Strictly Enforcing The GIAU Procedural Requirements Supports 
The Purpose Of The Act 19 
II. OLSEN'S POST-ACQUITTAL SUBMISSION OF HIS REQUEST FOR 
REIMBURSEMENT WAS UNTIMELY 22 
CONCLUSION 23 
ADDENDUM 25 
{00085894 DOC /} i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES PAGE NO. 
AOKLands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 
860 P.2d 924 (Utah 1993) 21 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 10 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987) 21, 22 
Cf. Nunez v. Albo, 
53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 20 
Chris & Dicks' Lumber v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990) 11 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) 11 
DeLand v. Uintah County, 
945 P.2d 172 (Utah 1997) 11 
Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections, 
24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001) 11 
Hulbert v. State, 
607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980) 14, 15, 16, 17 
Inrel.K., 
2009 UT 70 1 
Lyon v. Burton, 
5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) , 20 
Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989) 11 
Millet v. Logan City, 
147 P.3d 971 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 1 
{00085894.DOC /} U 
Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Com'n, 
175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007) 1 
Nielson v. Gurley, 1994, 
888 P.2d 130 (Utah 1994) 11 
Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 
911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996) 10 
Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
42 P.3d 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) 2 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 
947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997) 12 
Salmon v. Davis County, 
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) 10 
Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
168 P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) 8, 11 
Tuttle v. Olds, 
2007 UT App. 10 14 
Utah Transit Authority v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
2006 WL. 2992715 (D.Utah 2006) 21 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656P.2dat445 10 
Wheeler v. McPherson, 
40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002) 8, 11 
{00085894.DOC /} iii 
STATE STATUTES PAGE NO. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312(2) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201 7, 9, 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) 2, 3, 5,13 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(2) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 3,5,7,8,9,11, 12, 14, 15, 18,22 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-7-201 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-7-202 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-7-204 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-2-201(1) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-36 16,17 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-37 16, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-3 15, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 7,16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(l) 4, 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(a) 4, 9, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(a)(i) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b) 4, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(6) 4 
{00085894.DOC /} iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-903 3, 6, 12,17,19 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-903(2) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402 2, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0) 1 
{00085894.DOC /} V 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (Supp. 2008). The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition 
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on 
December 8, 2009. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Issue. Did the district court err in ruling that Olsen's claim for 
reimbursement of attorney fees was not precluded by his failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Governmental Immunities Act of Utah, specifically Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-902, where Olsen failed to request a defense from Eagle Mountain and failed to 
timely submit a request for reimbursement? 
2. Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to the district court. In re I.K., 2009 UT 70. Under 
Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and those 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic 
Com'n, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007). Thus, a motion to dismiss is appropriate where it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or 
under any set of facts he could prove to support his claim. Millet v. Logan City, 147 P.3d 
971 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). The same standard applies to motions brought pursuant to 
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Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 42 P.3d 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
3. Issue raised below. Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss Olsen's claims on 
the grounds that he failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the 
Governmental Immunities Act of Utah. (See Motion and Memorandum in Support, 
Record at 24-42). The district court denied the motion. (See Order, Record at 76-79). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case. Plaintiff/Appellee Brian Brent Olsen ("Olsen") was a 
former Mayor of the City of Eagle Mountain ("Eagle Mountain"). On or about October 
23, 2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office charged Olsen with seven counts of misuse 
of public money while serving as Mayor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402 (the 
"Criminal Case"). On September 25, 2008, after a four day trial, a jury returned a verdict 
of not guilty on all seven counts. 
On October 29, 2008, some 34 days post-acquittal, Olsen submitted a written 
request for reimbursement of $119,834.90 in alleged attorney fees and costs claimed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008). Eagle Mountain took no action on the 
request, and on February 4, 2009, Olsen filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court. 
2. Course of proceedings. Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Olsen 
failed to comply with the Governmental Immunities Act of Utah ("GIAU"). 
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3. Disposition at trial court. The trial court denied Eagle Mountain's motion 
to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Olsen is a former Mayor of Eagle Mountain. On or about October 23, 
2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office charged Olsen with seven counts of misuse of 
public money while serving as Mayor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402, all 
third degree felony counts. (Complaint, Record at 1). Olsen resigned as Mayor just prior 
to the announcement of the charges. On September 25, 2008, after a 4 day trial, a jury 
returned a verdict of not guilty on all seven counts. (Complaint, Record at 2). On 
October 29, 2008, some 34 days post-acquittal, Olsen submitted a written request for 
reimbursement of $119,834.90 in alleged attorney fees and costs claimed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008). (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
Exhibit A, Record at 42). Eagle Mountain took no action on the request, and on February 
4, 2009, Olsen filed a complaint seeking reimbursement in the Fourth District Court. 
(Complaint, Record at 1-2). 
In order to recover under the reimbursement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 56-2-
201(1), Olsen was required to comply with certain procedural requirements set forth in 
the GIAU. Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 (2008) provides: UA request for reimbursement 
of attorney fees shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-
903." Section 63G-7-902 ("Section 902") and Section 63G-7-903 ("Section 903") are 
provisions of the GIAU which set forth a number of specific obligations, conditions and 
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duties between governmental entities and their employees with respect to third party 
claims. 
Under specified conditions, Section 902 provides, inter alia, that a governmental 
entity "shall defend any action" brought against its employees arising from their 
employment. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(l) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, before a 
governmental entity may undertake to defend its employees against a claim, the 
employee is required to timely submit a written request to the governmental entity to 
defend the employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(a) (emphasis add). If the 
employee fails to submit the request, or the request is not timely, the governmental entity 
is not required to defend the employee and is relieved from further liability. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b). Under certain conditions, the governmental entity may 
also decline to defend an action against an employee or defend under a reservation of 
rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3) & (6). Finally, Section 903 sets forth certain 
conditions whereby an employee may recover against the governmental entity for 
judgments previously paid by the employee. 
In his Complaint, Olsen failed to allege compliance with the procedural 
requirements and conditions set forth in Section 902. (Complaint, Record 1-2). Olsen 
acknowledged that he did not make any type of written request or written demand on 
Eagle Mountain to defend the Criminal Case. (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Record at 43-47). Further, Olsen acknowledged that his 
first written request for reimbursement of attorney fees was not made until October 29, 
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2008, some 34 days after Olsen was acquitted. (See Id.; see also, Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Record at 42). 
Accordingly, Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that 
Olsen failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the reimbursement statute as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-6-202 and 63G-7-902(2). The district court denied Eagle 
Mountain's motion to dismiss and this interlocutory appeal followed. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
The statutes central to this motion are Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008), Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-6-202 (2008) and relevant portions of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902 
(2008).l 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) provides: 
If a state grand jury indicts, or if an information is filed 
against an officer or employee, in connection with or arising 
out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during 
the performance of the officer or employee's duties, within 
the scope of the officer or employee's employment, or under 
color of the officer or employee's authority, and that 
indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results 
in a judgment of acquittal... that officer or employee shall be 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs 
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or 
information from the public entity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 provides: 
Copies of the pertinent statutes cited herein are included in the addendum attached 
hereto in their entirety. 
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A request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs 
shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 
and 63G-7-903. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a 
governmental entity shall defend any action brought against 
its employee arising from an act or omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's 
duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's 
employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2)(a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee 
against a claim, the employee shall make a written request to 
the governmental entity to defend the employee: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon the 
employee; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice 
the governmental entity in maintaining a 
defense on the employee's behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not con flict with 
notice requirements imposed on the entity in 
connection with insurance carried by the entity 
relating to the risk involved. 
(2)(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to 
reasonably cooperate in the defense, including the making of 
an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Offers of Judgment, the governmental entity need 
not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any 
judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in 
respect to the claim. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to the plain language of the statutes at issue, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-6-
202 and 63G-7-902, Olsen was required to request a defense from Eagle Mountain within 
10 days after he was served with the criminal information. Olsen admittedly never 
requested a defense. Instead, Olsen claims that the requirements of Section 902 are not 
applicable in criminal cases. However, Olsen5s interpretation would render Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-6-202 completely meaningless. Furthermore, a review of the history of 
amendments to the reimbursement statute demonstrates that the Legislature specifically 
designated the GIAU procedures in Section 902 to apply to requests for reimbursement of 
attorney fees, rather than the more general "notice of claim" provision contained within 
the GIAU at Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401. 
Olsen further claims that under the reimbursement statute, Section 52-6-201, his 
claim for reimbursement did not arise until his acquittal; thus, he was required only to 
submit a written request for reimbursement in order to comply with Section 902. 
However, even accepting Olsen's assertion, the request was untimely. Olsen's written 
request for reimbursement was not submitted until October 29, 2008, some 34 days after 
his acquittal, and thus, far beyond than the ten (10) day requirement set forth in Section 
902. Because Olsen cannot demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of 
Section 902, his Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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ARGUMENT 
Although Olsen was required to submit a request for defense of the Criminal Case 
in order to perfect his claim for reimbursement of attorney fees in the event of acquittal, 
Olsen admits that he never made that request. According to Olsen, he was not required to 
request a defense because: (1) the procedures of Section 902 are not applicable to 
criminal actions; and (2) because the right to payment of attorney fees is for 
reimbursement and not a defense, such right does not mature until the time of acquittal. 
Hence, Olsen asserts that his written request for reimbursement submitted on October 29, 
2008, 34 days after acquittal, was sufficient to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 
and Section 902. 
Not only is Olsen's interpretation contrary to the plain language of the relevant 
statutes, but it would result in rendering Section 52-6-202 completely meaningless. 
Moreover, even accepting Olsen's assertion that his reimbursement claim did not arise 
until his acquittal, Olsen's request was nevertheless untimely. Olsen had 10 days to 
submit a written request for reimbursement under Section 902, and his October 29, 2008 
letter was not submitted until 34 days after acquittal. 
Because Olsen cannot demonstrate compliance with GIAU Section 902, the 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. See Suazo v. Salt Lake City 
Corp,, 168 P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (proper "notice of claim" under the GIAU 
must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 
(Utah 2002) (same). Therefore, Olsen's claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
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I. OLSEN WAS REQUIRED TO REQUEST A DEFENSE. 
A. The Plain Language Of The GIAU Specifies That Olsen Request A 
Defense. 
Section 902 of the GIAU provides that a governmental entity "shall defend any 
action" brought against its employees arising from their employment. Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-902(l) (emphasis added). However, before a governmental entity may undertake 
to defend an employee against a claim, the employee is required to timely submit a 
written request to the governmental entity to defend the employee. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-902(2)(a). This naturally implies that the request must be made before the 
defense is rendered. 
By the plain language of the relevant statutes, Olsen was required to request a 
defense. Olsen's claim for attorney fees is premised on the reimbursement statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-6-201. However, in order to recover under this statute, all requests for 
reimbursement of attorney fees "shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-
902 and 63G-7-903." See Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202. Sections 902 and 903 are 
specific sections of the GIAU which require that an employee meet the specified 
conditions, as well as follow the specified procedure, in order to perfect a claim for 
attorney fees. 
A straightforward reading of GIAU Section 902 confirms that the Legislature 
intended that defense and indemnification of government employees would be 
conditioned on fulfillment of certain obligations by the employee, including, at a 
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minimum, the timely submission of a written request for a defense. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-902(2)(a). If the employee fails to submit the request, or the request is not 
timely, the governmental entity is not required to defend the employee and is relieved 
from further liability for the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b). 
Eagle Mountain has found no cases directly on point interpreting these statutes. 
Nevertheless, the principles of statutory construction are well established under Utah law. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996): 
[T]his Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative 
enactments is to give effect to the Legislature's underlying 
intent." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982); see also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 ("The statutes ... of 
this state ... are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."). 
Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's 
plain language. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). Thus, we will interpret a statute 
according to its plain language, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of the statute. West 
Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446. 
Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1292. Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain, the 
Court should enforce the statute by reference to the "usual and accepted meaning" of its 
2
 In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), Davis County asserted the 
same procedural defect as a defense to a claim for attorney fees where the employee 
failed to make a written request for a defense of a criminal charge until after trial. The 
issue was not decided, however, because Davis County failed to raise the defense until 
the matter was on appeal and the Court found any defect was waived. Salmon, 916 P.2d 
at 894 at fn. 3. 
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terms. See DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1997); Clover v. 
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Chris & Dicks'Lumber v. Utah 
State Tax Comm % 791 P.2d 511,514 (Utah 1990). 
Numerous cases have held that the GIAU (and its predecessor, the Utah 
Governmental Immunities Act) must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Hall v. Utah State 
Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 965 (Utah 2001); Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corp., 168 
P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002); see 
also, Nielson v. Gurley, 1994, 888 P.2d 130, (Utah 1994) (interpreting Utah 
Governmental Immunities Act). For example, a party must strictly comply with the 
GIAU's notice of claim requirement, even if the governmental entity at issue has actual 
notice of the claim. Hall, 24 P.3d at 965. In other words, "where the government grants 
statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be 
followed precisely." Id. Under a strict interpretation of the plain statutory language of 
Section 902, Olsen was required to request a defense. 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 Must Be Given Effect. 
It is well settled that a court should seek "to render all parts of a [statute] relevant 
and meaningful" and avoid interpretations that "will render portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 963 
(Utah 2001) (citations omitted) (allowing governmental immunity to bar Whistleblower 
Act claims would eviscerate the Act by preventing any real enforcement); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989) (in interpreting statutes, Court has fundamental duty 
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to give effect, if possible, to every word of statute). Furthermore, the court should 
assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly by the Legislature. See Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997) (overruling court of appeals1 narrow 
construction of the inclusive language "others rendering similar care and services" on 
grounds that such construction eviscerates, if not eliminates, any effect that language 
might have). 
Olsen asserts that Section 902 is inapplicable to criminal cases. However, Olsen's 
interpretation of the statute leaves one critical question unanswered: Why did the 
Legislature specify that the procedures in "Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903" apply to 
claims for reimbursement of attorney fees? Clearly, the reimbursement statute itself 
applies solely to criminal cases. If Section 902 were applicable only in civil matters, then 
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 would be rendered completely meaningless. 
If, as Olsen suggests, the reference to the GIAU was simply to refer to the "manner" in 
which a claim shall be filed, i.e. "making a written request to the governmental entity," 
then the Legislature could have simply stated so. Surely the Legislature did not enact 
Section 52-6-202 for no purpose whatsoever. 
Olsen challenges the application of Section 902 to criminal cases based on its use 
of terminology more commonly associated with civil cases. Yet, any of the terms in 
Section 902 can be reasonably interpreted by applying the criminal analog. 
For instance, in this case, the criminal charges were commenced by the filing of an 
information and the issuance of a summons. The information and summons were then 
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served on Mr. Olsen, in a manner analogous to service of process in civil matters. See 
Rule 6(c)(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring that a summons shall be 
served "as in civil actions," or by mail). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
time period to provide a written request for a defense to Eagle Mountain was triggered 
upon service of the summons. The reasonable meaning of service of process is simply 
when the case has been initiated. Other terms in the statute can be similarly interpreted. 
Judgment is reasonably understood as a criminal judgment, including fines, restitution or 
other payments of money imposed on a criminal defendant. The terms "compromise" 
and "settlement" as applied to criminal cases are circumstances specifically addressed by 
the reimbursement statute itself. See Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) & (2) (2008) 
(excluding reimbursement for attorney fees for indictment or information, or portions 
thereof, quashed upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney). 
Further, the reimbursement statute is not the only instance where the Legislature 
has enacted pre-trial procedures to accomplish a similar goal. A comparable statutory 
procedure was enacted for the reimbursement of attorney fees and costs in Article V 
lawsuits against public officers. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-7-201 to 52-7-204. Under 
this procedure, a public officer is entitled to "reimbursement" of attorney fees and costs 
in defending an Article V lawsuit only if the officer provides the Legislative Management 
Committee with notice of the claim, the retained attorney, and estimated rates and fees to 
defend the case. See Utah Code Ann. § 52-7-202. 
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Since Olsen's interpretation would, in effect, nullify Section 52-6-202, it should be 
rejected. 
C. The Legislature Purposefully Selected The GIAU Procedures in 
Section 902 Rather Than The Notice of Claim Procedure. 
Although there is no recorded legislative history concerning enactment of the 
reimbursement statute, a review of the history of its original language in 1977 and later 
amendments in 1983 and 1986, demonstrates that the Legislature clearly intended that the 
procedures in Section 902 apply to criminal cases. 
The attorney fees' reimbursement statute was first examined in Hulbert v. State, 
607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980). In Hulbert, the plaintiff sought to recover attorney fees 
incurred in the successful defense of 12 indictments. After trial, plaintiff submitted his 
notice of claim to the State of Utah pursuant to the notice of claim provision of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (the predecessor to the GIAU).3 After expiration of the 90-
day statutory period for a response, the claim was deemed to be denied and Hulbert filed 
a claim in the district court. Hulbert, at 1218. 
Hulbert asserted that his claim was reviewable by the district court based on the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. According to Hulbert, the "notice 
of claim" procedure applied, which expressly provided for jurisdiction in the district 
court. The 1977 version of the reimbursement statute stated: "This act shall apply to 
3
 The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed on July 1, 2004, and replaced 
by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah on the same date. See Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 
UTApplO,fn2. 
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claims arising prior to the effective date of this act so long as those claims are filed in the 
manner provided in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." Hulbert at 1218-19 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-3 (1977), a predecessor to Utah Code § 52-6-202); see also, 
Record at 58. The State of Utah disagreed and asserted that the Utah Constitution, 
Article VII, Section 13, providing for jurisdiction vesting in the Board of Examiners 
limited Hulbert to that forum, and that no jurisdiction or review was available in the 
district court. The State argued that the language in the reimbursement statute (1977 
version) merely required an employee to submit a "notice of claim" to the State Board of 
Examiners. Accordingly, the State claimed that the specific procedures set forth in the 
GIAU, including those provisions providing for jurisdiction and review by the district 
court, did not apply to a claim for reimbursement. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the District Court, agreed with Hulbert and held 
that the language in the reimbursement statute was not intended to be so limited. As the 
Court noted, "it would have been a simple matter to designate the section number of the 
Governmental Immunity Act (e.g., the "notice of claim" provision) and stipulate those 
provisions solely were to apply to a claim under Section 63-30a." Hulbert 607 P.2d at 
1219. The Court noted that the term "manner" is defined as the mode or method in which 
something is done or happens, and interpreted the statute as "prescribing the mode of 
procedure set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act." Id. The Court found that 
Hulbert complied with the appropriate procedures by complying with the "notice of 
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claim" procedure as set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the district 
court had jurisdiction. Id. 
Subsequently, in 1983, after the Hulbert decision, the Legislature amended the 
reimbursement statute to read: "[a] request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court 
costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Section 63-30-11." See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30a-3 (1983) (Record at 60). In 1983, Section 63-30-11 was the operative "notice of 
claim" provision of the UGIA, and provided for the filing of a Notice of Claim with a 
governmental entity prior to initiating suit in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-11 (1983) (Record at 62). Thus, in 1983, the "notice of claim" procedure required 
only that a claimant submit a basic written request, or "notice," in order to perfect a claim 
for reimbursement of attorney fees. Although over time there have been amendments to 
the "notice of claim" procedure,4 the "notice of claim" procedure remains a part of the 
present GIAU, as enacted in 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 (2008). 
Tellingly, in 1986, the reimbursement statute was amended yet again. This time, 
the language was changed to state: "[a] request for reimbursement of attorney fees and 
court costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-3 (1986) (Record at 66) (emphasis added). Rather than 
referring generally to the Utah Governmental Immunities Act, as in the 1977 version or 
to the specific "notice of claim" procedure as in the 1983 version, for this amendment, 
4
 For example, reducing the time period to respond to a Notice of Claim from 90 
days to 60 days) 
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the Legislature designated specific code sections of the Governmental Immunities Act. 
The designated sections, 63-30-36 and 63-30-37, were subsequently renumbered to 
Sections 63G-7-902 (Section 902) and 63G-7-903 (Section 903) in 2008.5 Thus, instead 
of requiring claims for reimbursement to be submitted using a simple "notice of claim" 
procedure, the Legislature deliberately specified the procedures and conditions to be 
followed, now set forth in Sections 902 and 903, including the requirement that an 
employee must present a written request to the governmental entity for a defense at the 
inception of the case. 
Thus, based on a review of the history of amendments to the reimbursement 
statute with respect to the procedure for perfecting a claim, there is no question that the 
Legislature specifically intended that Sections 902 and 903 apply to claims for 
reimbursement of attorney fees. For Olsen to suggest otherwise completely ignores the 
direct, purposeful action of the Legislature in response to the Hulbert decision.6 Contrary 
to Olsen's proposed interpretation, the Legislature did not exempt criminal actions from 
the requirements of Section 902. 
By specifying the application of Section 902, the Legislature sought to provide the 
governmental entity the opportunity to employ its own counsel or arrange for competent 
5
 For the court's convenience, copies of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-36 and § 63-30-37 
(1983) were included in the Record at 63-64. These sections were subsequently 
renumbered and reorganized, with slight modifications, into the present Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903 (2008), respectively. 
6
 As the Court noted in Hulbert, "it would have been a simple matter to designate 
the section number of the [GIAU] and stipulate those provisions solely were to apply to a 
claim under [the reimbursement statute]." Hulbert, 607 P.2d at 1219. 
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independent counsel, control costs and the amount of attorney fees incurred, and 
investigate and evaluate the claim. Obviously, legal fees may be substantial and a 
governmental entity would necessarily include such items in its budget process. By 
applying the procedures of Sections 902 and 903 to criminal actions, the Legislature 
foresaw the need to involve a governmental entity in the defense at the inception of a 
criminal case against an employee, rather than after trial or upon acquittal. The 
Legislature simply sought to apply the procedure already set forth in the GIAU to 
criminal cases, for the purpose of ensuring that a governmental entity is significantly 
involved in defending its employees, rather than requiring the employee to simply "make 
a written request" for reimbursement. 
The Legislature's specific purpose is further evidenced by the reference to Section 
903 as part of the procedural requirements of the reimbursement statute set forth in 
Section 52-6-202. Section 903 applies to those situations where a governmental entity 
has declined to provide for or arrange for a defense of an employee, and the employee 
hires counsel or pays a judgment that the governmental entity is obligated (under certain 
conditions) to pay. If, as Olsen argues, the references to Sections 902 and 903 were 
merely to require that an employee claiming reimbursement of attorney fees to make a 
written request to the governmental entity after acquittal, then the inclusion of Section 
903 would be completely superfluous. Of course, the Legislature could have specified 
the "notice of claim" procedure, as it did in the 1983 version of the reimbursement 
statute. 
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The application of Section 903 is consistent with interpreting the reimbursement 
statute to require that Olsen request a defense under Section 902. For example, should 
the governmental entity decline to defend the case, after notice is provided in accordance 
with Section 902, then the employee may recover his attorney fees and costs incurred in 
the employee's defense upon acquittal. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-903(2) (2008). 
The history of amendments to the statute demonstrates that the Legislature 
purposefully intended to provide the governmental entity with options at the inception of 
a criminal case against an employee. Once an employee makes a demand or provides 
notice of the intent to seek reimbursement, the governmental entity is free to provide for a 
defense, provide for a defense under a "reservation of rights," or deny the claim entirely 
and be subject to the reimbursement requirement if the employee is acquitted. To the 
extent the employee chooses not to demand a defense, the employee is free to hire 
counsel of his choice and proceed according to his wishes, but loses the right of 
reimbursement. The Legislature's purpose in applying the procedures of GIAU Section 
902 was clearly to provide the governmental entity with the opportunity to have a role in 
the process. Olsen disregarded the procedure and those safeguards entirely, at his own 
election, and consequently, his claim for reimbursement should be dismissed. 
D. Strictly Enforcing The GIAU Procedural Requirements Supports The 
Purpose Of The Act 
One important purpose of the Legislature behind enacting Section 52-6-201 and 
Section 902 is to encourage qualified persons to serve as public officials without 
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incurring the risk of exposure to exorbitant legal fees to defend ill-founded actions, 
including criminal actions. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (Requiring 
governmental entity to provide a defense protects employee from financial loss). 
However, an employee's right to a government-funded defense is not an unfettered right 
to privately retain counsel and seek reimbursement, unless the government entity has 
declined to defend the case. On the contrary, Section 902 of the GIAU provides 
procedural protections to the governmental entity in order to limit its exposure to 
unfounded claims. Cf. Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (Primary purpose 
of notice of claim provision is to afford the responsible public authorities opportunity to 
pursue a proper and timely investigation of merits of claim and to arrive at a timely 
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding expenditure of public revenue for costly and 
unnecessary litigation). Allowing Olsen to skirt these procedural requirements would 
deflate the purpose of the Act. 
The opportunity denied Eagle Mountain to either defend Olsen, or arrange for a 
defense against the criminal charges, is not inconsequential. Eagle Mountain was 
prejudiced from having no involvement in negotiating or contracting for the defense, its 
costs, or potential resolution without need for trial. Permitting an employee to proceed 
without notice to the employer, as happened here, would completely eliminate the 
governmental entity from participating in the defense of a claim. As a result, the very 
purpose of these provisions (i.e., to provide the governmental entity the opportunity to 
employ its own counsel or arrange for competent independent counsel, control costs and 
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the amount of attorney fees incurred, and investigate and evaluate the claim) would be 
wholly ineffective. Section 902 protects the governmental entity from the potential for 
exploitation by an employee. For example, shortly before trial or shortly after acquittal, a 
criminal defense attorney, knowing he would be reimbursed, could substantially increase 
his fees and/or add additional "result" fees post- acquittal, all without the knowledge or 
control of the governmental entity. Prior agreement by the governmental entity would 
avoid these types of problems. 
Moreover, the procedural requirements of Section 902 are not burdensome or 
unique. Analogous provisions have been routinely enforced in the insurance context. 
For example, insurance policies often contain a similar notice requirement wherein an 
insured must present a potential claim to the insurance company and request a defense. 
Where an insurance company has been prejudiced by the failure to provide notice and by 
the denial of its ability to investigate and participate in the defense of a claim, the 
insured's claim may be denied. The reason for this is clear. Where the insurer no longer 
has the opportunity to resolve or settle the claim, and was denied the opportunity to 
' See e.g., Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987) 
(insureds1 failure to notify insurers of claims and request indemnity therefor until 
approximately five years after claims occurred precluded insurers1 liability); AOK Lands, 
Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924 (Utah 1993) (Insured's failure to notify 
"errors and omissions" insurer until after eight years of litigation had concluded and 
$400,000 judgment against insured was in place relieved insurer of its obligation under 
the policy; insurer was prejudiced in being deprived of opportunity to participate in any 
way in defense of suit"); Utah Transit Authority v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 
2992715 (D.Utah 2006); see also, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312(2) (2005) ("[fjailure to 
give notice or file proof of loss as required by [the insurance policy] does not bar 
recovery under the policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure"). 
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employ its own counsel or control costs and attorney fees, it is unfair to hold the insurer 
liable to indemnify the insured. Busch, 743 P.2d at 1220-21. 
Similarly, it is unfair to hold a governmental entity liable for judgments or 
outcomes in which it was denied an opportunity to present a defense, and was prejudiced 
by that denial. 
II. OLSEN'S POST-ACQUITTAL SUBMISSION OF HIS REQUEST FOR 
REIMBURSEMENT WAS UNTIMELY. 
Even accepting Olsen's assertion that his claim for reimbursement did not arise 
until he was acquitted on September 25, 2008, Olsen's claim nevertheless fails because 
his written request for reimbursement was not submitted until October 29, 2008, some 34 
days after his acquittal. 
According to Olsen, the reference in Section 52-6-202 to filing a claim for 
reimbursement "in the manner provided in Sections 902 and 903" simply refers to the 
manner in which a claim shall be filed, e.g., by "making a written request to the 
governmental entity." Again, even assuming that Section 52-6-202 can be so narrowly 
construed, Olsen cannot pick and choose which portions of 902 that he finds are 
applicable. Clearly, Section 902 requires that the "written request" submitted to the 
governmental entity must be made "within ten days." Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-
902(2)(a)(i). Because Olsen's request was untimely, his Complaint should be dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Olsen failed to request that Eagle Mountain defend the Criminal Case and 
his written request for reimbursement of attorney fees was untimely, the Supreme Court 
should reverse the district court and Olsen's claim should be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted this JIQ day of January, 2010. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Profession<u\Corporation 
d£ 
Gerara H JjCingporn 
Catherine NQ. Brabson 
Attorneys ity* Defendant/Appellant 
City of Eagle Mountain 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT along with a CD containing an electronic copy 
of the Enhanced Courtesy Brief and PDF of the Addendum was hereby served via 
U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, on this<^^n day of January, 2010 to the following: 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATS & GELDZAHLER 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
cy^^/y)nfmaJmc— 
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M. David Eckersley (0956) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Electronic Mail: mde@princeyeates.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN BRENT OLSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 090400584 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court for hearing on August 20, 
2009. Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, M. David Eckersley. The 
Defendant was represented by Gerald Kinghorn. After having reviewed the memoranda of 
the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters the following: 
fEATES 
AHLER 
Suite 900 
X) South 
eCity 
\ 1000 
CE, YEATES 
•LDZAHLER 
rrtre I, Surte 900 
ast 400 South 
It Lake City 
tahA4111 
ORDER 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied. 
DATED this k Vof ^~Jh . 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
Fourth Judicial District 
-"mM 
Approved as to Form: 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
GERALD H. KINGHORN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2009,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon, to the 
following: 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Catherine L. Brabson 
Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
!4WJlli(uM^ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
?E, YEATES 
LDZAHLER 
itre I, Suite 900 
ist 400 South 
I Lake Crty 
ah 84111 
I hereby certify that on the day of 2009,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the conformed Order to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon, to 
the following: 
G \Mde\Olsen\Order Docx 
Gerald H. Kinghorn 
Catherine L. Brabson 
Parsons Kinghorn Harris 
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Clerk of the Court 
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U C A 1953 § 52-6-201 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 52 Public Officers 
* ! Chapter 6 Reimbursement of Legal Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees Act 
*ffl Part 2 Attorney Fees and Court Costs 
-t § 52-6-201. Indictment or information against officer or employee-Reimbursement of attorney 
fees and court costs incurred in defense 
(1) If a state grand jury indicts, or if an information is filed against, an officer or employee, in connection with 
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during the performance of the officer or em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of the officer or employee's employment, or under color of the officer or em-
ployee's authority, and that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquit-
tal, unless the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or motion of the prosecuting 
attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily 
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information from the public entity, unless the officer or employee is 
found guilty of substantially the same misconduct that formed the basis for the indictment or information 
(2) If the officer or employee is acquitted of some of the charges or counts, or portions of the indictment or in-
formation are quashed or dismissed, that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover from the public entity 
reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of those charges, counts, or portions 
of the indictment or information that were quashed, dismissed, or resulted in a judgment of acquittal, unless the 
misconduct covered by those charges, counts, or portions of the indictment or information that were quashed, 
dismissed, or resulted in a judgment of acquittal is substantially the same misconduct that formed the basis for 
charges, counts, or portions of the indictment or information of which the officer or employee was found guilty 
(3) An officer or employee who recovers under this section shall also be entitled to recover reasonable attorney 
fees and costs necessarily incurred by the officer or employee in recovering the attorney fees and costs allowed 
under this section, including attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an officer or employee may not recover for the costs in-
curred in defense of any charge, count, or portion of the indictment or information that is quashed or dismissed 
upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 52-6-202 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 52. Public Officers 
* ! Chapter 6. Reimbursement of Legal Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees Act 
* ! Part 2. Attorney Fees and Court Costs 
-• § 52-6-202. Payment of reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs 
(1) A request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Sec-
tions 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903. 
(2)(a) Any reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs filed on behalf of an officer or employee of the state 
shall be paid from funds appropriated to the department or division that employed the officer or employee at the 
time of the act or omission that gave rise to the indictment or information. 
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimbursement shall be paid from the General Fund upon approval by 
the Board of Examiners and legislative appropriation. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-7-401 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-30d-401 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 63 G. General Government 
*ii Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos) 
*il Part 4. Notice of Claim Against a Governmental Entity or a Government Employee 
_t § 63G-7-401. Claim for injury—Notice-Contents-Service-Legal disability-Appointment of 
guardian ad litem 
(l)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if 
the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission oc-
curring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of au-
thority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in Subsection 
63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee. 
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(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office 
of: 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school district 
or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or spe-
cial service district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the state; 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim is 
against any other public board, commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental en-
tity under Subsection (5)(e). 
(4)(a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity is sustained 
by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may file a re-
quest with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63G-7-402 begins when the 
order appointing the guardian is issued. 
(5)(a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the Division of Cor-
porations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is accurate. 
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental entities to 
complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(d)(i) A newly incorporated municipality shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) promptly after 
the lieutenant governor issues a certificate of incorporation under Section 67-la-6.5. 
(ii) A newly incorporated local district shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that 
the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215. 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept notices of 
claim on its behalf. 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity and by 
county of operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy. 
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it was not dir-
ected and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental entity's failure to file 
or update the statement required by Subsection (5). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1498, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 350, § 64, eff. May 12, 2009. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-7-902 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-30d-902 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 63G. General Government 
* ! Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos) 
* ! Part 9. Coverage and Representation of State Entities and Employees 
-+ § 63G-7-902. Defending government employee—Request-Cooperation—Payment of judgment 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall defend any action brought against 
its employee arising from an act or omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2)(a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the employee shall make a written 
request to the governmental entity to defend the employee: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon the employee; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on the 
employee's behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on the entity in connection 
with insurance carried by the entity relating to the risk involved. 
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, including the mak-
ing of an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment, the govern-
mental entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or set-
tlement against the employee in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or, subject to any court rule or order, decline to continue to 
defend, an action against an employee if it determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur: 
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(i) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(ii) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; or 
(b) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from conditions set forth in Subsection 
63G-7-202(3)(c). 
(4)(a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity shall in-
form the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for 
its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any purpose in the action in which the 
employee is a defendant. 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the gov-
ernmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim. 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a reservation of rights under which the 
governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment if any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) 
are established. 
(7)(a) Nothing in this section or Section 63G-7-903 affects the obligation of a governmental entity to provide in-
surance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63G-7-802. 
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend, an action against its em-
ployee under any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide coverage up to the amount 
specified in Section 31A-22-304. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-7-903 Page 1 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-30d-903 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 63G. General Government 
*a Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos) 
*1 Part 9. Coverage and Representation of State Entities and Employees 
«t § 63G-7-903. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, that the 
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63G-7-902, the employee may recover from the govern-
mental entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in the employee's defense. 
(2)(a) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts the de-
fense under a reservation of rights as provided in Subsection 63G-7-902(6), the employee may recover from the 
governmental entity under Subsection (1) if the employee can prove that none of the conditions set forth in Sub-
section 63G-7-202(3)(c) applied. 
(b) The employee has the burden of proof that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c) 
applied. 
CREDIT(S) 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Ch. 245 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL [1000] 
employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not 
include an independent contractor. 
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or 
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council, 
authority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other 
instrumentality of the state or any such political subdivision. 
Section 2. State officers or employees—Successful defense of grand jury 
indictment—Reimbursement for reasonable legal fees and costs 
incurred. 
If a state grand jury indicts an officer or employee, in connection with or 
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment or under color 
of his authority, and that indictment is quashed or dismissed or results in a 
judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment is quashed or dismissed upon 
application or motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee 
shall be entitled to recover from the state the reasonable attorneys* fees and 
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment. 
Section 3. Limited retroactivity. 
This act shall apply to claims arising prior to the effective date of this act 
so long as those claims are filed in the manner provided in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and within two years after the cause of action 
arises. 
Approved March 21, 1977. 
CHAPTER 246 
S. B. No. 272 (Passed March 10, 1977. In effect May 10, 1977 
Failed to obtain 2/3 vote required for earlier effect) 
FIRE MARSHALS AS PEACE OFFICERS 
AN ACT ENACTING SECTION 63-29-27, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; RELATING 
TO THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL; PROVIDING THAT THE STATE FIRE 
MARSHAL AND HIS DEPUTIES AND INVESTIGATORS SHALL BE VESTED 
WITH POWERS OF PEACE OFFICERS. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section enacted. 
Section 63-29-27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
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63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or employee—Reimburse-
ment of attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in defense. 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed against an officer 
or employee, in connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that 
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
his employment or under color of his authority, and that indictment or infor-
mation is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless 
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled 
to recover from the [state the] public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and 
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or informa-
tion. 
Section 8. Section repealed and reenacted. 
Section 63~30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245, 
Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed and reenacted to read: 
63-30a-3. Request for defense or reimbursement. 
A request for a defense of a criminal charge or indictment and for reim-
bursement of attorneys' fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner pro-
vided in section 63-30-11. 
Section 9. Separability clause. 
If any provision of this chapter or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected 
thereby. 
Section 10. Chapter repealed. 
Chapter 48, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed. 
Approved March 30, 1983. 
HEALTH 
CHAPTER 132 
H. B. No. 176 (Passed February 14, 1983. In effect May 10, 1983.) 
ACCREDITATION INFORMATION 
By Representative McKeachnie 
AN ACT RELATING TO ACCREDITATION INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH BY HOSPITALS; PROVIDING THAT ACCREDITATION INFORMA-
TION SHALL BE PRIVATE DATA. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 26-21-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY 
CHAPTER 126, LAWS OF UTAH 1981. 
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CHAPTER 131 
H B No 290 (Passed March 10, 1983 In effect May 10, 1983 ) 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT MODIFICATIONS 
By Representative McKeachme 
AN ACT RELATING TO INDEMNIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES; MODI-
FYING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
TIES, AND APPLYING SUCH REQUIREMENTS TO CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEES 
FOR ACTS OR OMISSIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT; PROVIDING FOR 
INDEMNIFICATION OF OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES AGAINST WHOM AN INFORMA-
TION IS FILED; AND PROVIDING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTIONS 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 27, LAWS OF UTAH 1978, AND SECTION 63-
30a-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1977; ENACTS SECTIONS 63-30-36, 63-30-37, AND 63-30-38, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953; REPEALS AND REENACTS SECTION 63-30a-3, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245, LAWS OF UTAH 1977; AND REPEALS 
CHAPTER 48, TITLE 63, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read: 
63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Contents—Service—Legal disability. 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that would 
apply if the claim were against a private person commences to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury [to person or property] against a 
governmental entity or [its] against an employee for an act or omission occur-
ring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall, before maintaining an action [under this act], 
file a written notice of claim with such entity [for appropriate relief including 
money damages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the 
facts and the nature of the claim asserted, shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, 
and shall be directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
within the time prescribed in section 63 30 12 or 63 30 13, as applicable.] 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts, the 
nature of the claim asserted, and the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known, shall be signed by the person making the claim or such 
person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity in the manner and within the 
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable. 
[Sendee of the notice of claim upon an employee of a governmental entity 
*s not a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special 
proceeding against such person. If an action or special proceeding is com 
nioncod against the employee, but not against the governmental entity, ser 
H^M of the notice of claim upon the governmental entity is required only if 
*ho entity has a statutory duty to indemnify such person.] 
Laws of Utah 1986 Ch. 194 
a after the date of the 
"jLved by the practitioner. 
prescription unless 
(iii) All other controlled substances in schedule V 
ma/ 
be refilled as the preserver's prescription shall 
!Tect, DUl i n n 0 e v e n l s n a ^ l n e y D e refilled one year 
Iter the date the prescription was issued unless 
*
 ncwed by the practitioner. 
(iv) Any prescription for a schedule II, III, and 
,V substance which is not presented to a pharmacist 
for dispensing by a pharmacist or if an oral prescr-
non, which is not obtained within ten days of the 
date the prescription was written or authorized, may 
not be filled or dispensed. 
[fWl (g) Ari order for a controlled substance in 
schedules"II through V for use by an inpatient or an 
outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from all 
requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient 
and designates the quantity ordered; 
(ii) duly entered upon the record of the patient 
and the record is signed by the prescriber affirming 
his authorization of the order within 48 hours after 
the filling or administering the order and the 
patient's record reflects the quantity actually adm-
inistered; and 
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practi-
cing his profession within the physical structure of 
ihe hospital or the order is taken from a supply 
lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount 
taken from the supply is administered directly to the 
patient authorized to receive it. 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed 
practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure, or 
procure the administration of, a controlled subst-
ance is deemed to be a privileged communication. 
Section 14. Section Amended. 
Section 58-48-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1985, is 
amended to read: 
5S-4M. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) 'Contest* means all live boxing contests, 
matches, performances, sparring matches, or exhi-
bitions, demonstrating the skill and ability of prof-
essional boxers, where an admission fee is charged. 
Jl does not include amateur boxing contests as 
defined by the Amateur Athletic Union. 
(2) "Commission' 
Commission. 
0) "Director" means the director of the division. 
W "Division" means the Division of [ftegk»fra-
lm Occu^ationaUnd[Professional I .icensing. 
(5) "Professional boxer" means a boxer who 
^ M c s for a purse. 
lion se" mcans any money, prize, remuncra-
»*Jr°r a n y o t n e r valuable consideration for which 
ai>rof
^onal boxer competes. 
Ibe f UJ g r 0 S S r c c e iP l s" means t , , e amount ol 
^ *
cc v a l u e
 of all tickets sold to a particular 
hold! [?us anV sums received as consideration for 
«"*contest at a particular location. 
means the Utah Athletic 
Section 15. Section Amended. 
Section 63-la-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 96, Laws of Utah 1985, is 
amended to read: 
63-la-8. Bond required - Terms - Expenses of 
debtor. 
(1) If a complaint is filed by the debtor for a 
judicial review of an order entered under this 
chapter, the debtor shall furnish a bond to the State 
Tax Commission, with good and sufficient sureties, 
in the amount of the delinquent receivable or the 
amount of any overpayment or refund due, which-
ever is less, unless waived by the court. The lien 
created by Section 63-la-6 is then dissolved as to 
that overpayment or refund and the overpayment or 
refund shall be released to the debtor. 
(2) The bond shall provide that the surety will 
pay, upon a final determination adverse to the 
debtor, the amount of the bond or any other lesser 
amount as the court may determine, to the State 
Tax Commission for the use and benefit of the 
entity of state government obtaining the order. 
(3) If the judicial review finds the claim of the 
state invalid, the state shall reimburse the [defen 
data] debtor all reasonable expenses and attorney's 
fees incurred. 
Section 16. Section Amended. 
Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
63-30a-.». Request for defense or reimbursement. 
A recjuest for a defense of a criminal charge or 
indictment and for reimbursement of attorneys' fees 
and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided 
in [section 63 30 11) Sections 63-30-36 and _63; 
30-37. 
Section 17. Section Amended. 
Section 63-56-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah 
1985, is amended to read: 
63-56-3. Compliance with federal law -
Exemptions from chapter. 
(1) This chapter is not applicable to funds admi-
nistered under the Percent-for-Art Program of 
the Utah Percent-for-Art Act. 
(2) This chapter is not applicable to grants 
awarded by the state or contracts between the state 
and local public procurement units except as prov-
ided in part I of this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prevent the state or a 
local public procurement unit fiom complying with 
the terms and conditions of mix grant, gift, or 
bequest that is otherwise consistent with law. 
(4) When a procurement involves the expenditure 
of federal assistance or contract funds, the chief 
procurement officer or head of ;• purchasing agenev 
shall comply with mandatory applicable federal law 
and regulations not reflected in I his chapter. 
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(4) If, at the time the claim arises, the claimant is under the age of major-
ity, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned [at 
the time the cause of action accrued], upon application by the claimant and 
after hearing and notice to the governmental entity the court, in its discre-
tion, may extend the time for service of notice of claimf^j, but in no event 
shall it grant an extension which exceeds the applicable [general statutory 
period of limitation applicable to the cause of action] statute of limitations. In 
determining whether to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether 
the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the govern-
mental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read: 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee—Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the [cause of 
action] claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under subsection 63-30-11 (4). 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read: 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee—Time for filing 
notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the [CQUGO of action] claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under subsection 63-30-11 (4). 
Section 4. Section enacted. 
Section 63-30-36, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
63-30-36. Defending government employee—Request—Cooperation—Payment 
of judgment. 
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, 
the employee must make a written request to the governmental entity to 
defend him and must make it within ten days after service of process upQQ 
him or within such longer period as would not prejudice the flovernmental 
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, or conflict with notice reqmrg: 
ments imposed on the entity in connection with insurant carried by the 
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee fails to make a request^: 
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity i§ng-
required to defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay anyjugg: 
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ment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the 
claim. 
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the 
governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon or any compromise 
or settlement of the claim except as provided in subsection (3). 
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee 
under an agreement with the employee that the government entity reserves 
the right not to pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement unless it is 
established that the claim arose out of an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color 
of authority. 
Section 5. Section enacted. 
Section 63-30-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government 
employee. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered 
against him, or any portion of it, which the governmental entity is required to 
pay under section 63-30-36, the employee is entitled to recover the amount of 
such payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the gov-
ernmental entity. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee 
against a claim, or does conduct the defense under an agreement as provided 
in subsection 63-30-36 (3), the employee may recover from the governmental 
entity under subsection (1) if: 
(a) The employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the 
judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted 
the defense in good faith; and 
(b) The governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage 
resulted from the fraud or malice of the employee. 
Section 6. Section enacted. 
Section 63-30-38; Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a com-
promise or settlement of a claim against the governmental entity or an 
employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental 
entity for the payment. 
Section 7. Section amended. 
Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245, 
Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
